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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
PETE MOLETON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, and PA-
CIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No .. 
7379 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEME'NT 
This is a suit for personal injuries brought by Pete 
Moleton, an employe of the Pacific Fruit Express Company, 
against the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Pa-
cific Fruit Express Company. The first cause of action of 
plaintiff's complaint proceeds upon the theory that Moleton's 
right of recovery is predicated upon the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A., Sections 51 et seq. This is the 
only cause of action of plaintiff's complaint material to this 
appeal for reasons which will be hereinafter noted. For con-
venience the appellant Pete Moleton will be hereafter re-
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2 
ferred to as the plaintiff; the respondent Union Pacific Rail-~~ 1 
road Company will sometimes be referred to as the railroad ,)e5 ° 
company; and the respondent Pacific Fruit Express Com- :~ 8 
pany will sometimes be referred to as the express company. ~on 
We accept the statement of facts contained in plaintiff's :E~~ 
;®001 
brief with the following exceptions : 
te!P 
At page 6 of his brief the plaintiff asserts in his state- ;~tlu 
ment of facts that the argument on the motions to dismiss 
plaintiff's complaint made by the defendants at the conclu- ;:~ge 
sion of the plaintiff's case were almost entirely devoted to 
the applicability of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. :!!tttl 
This statement is true, but it is only fair to go further and J1fi]fia 
point out that this. took place because plaintiff's attorneys J~oftl 
conceded at the outset of the argument that they were of =~tE~ 
the opinion that the strongest theory in support of plain- ::"gooa 
tiff's cause of action was dependent upon the applicability Jo~ri 
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We wish to make ~!U!Xll 
it clear that the defendants have always contended and now ~EX~! 
reiterate that there is no lHtbility in this case even in the:~of I 
event that the Federal Employers' Liability Act has applica- ~~lug-1 
tion. This contention was thoroughly presented to the trial :nnat 
court by the motions for nonsuit and by the argument there-Jinepl 
on and will be discussed in this brief. ~inan 
At page 10 of his brief the plaintiff asserts that it was Hffect 
the responsibility of the express company to take care of the 
work to be done on the refrigerator cars in the yards ahtiffJ 
Laramie as disclosed by the information contained on the;~iou 
switch list mentioned in plaintiff's brief and in the evidence.~nya1 
If plaintiff intends to leave the inference that only such 
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work as was mentioned in the switch list was done by 
employes of the express company, then he is in error. The 
evidence shows that the express company is a separate or-
ganization engaged in an independent business ; that other 
work is performed by the employes of this company than is 
mentioned in the switch list described in the evidence, and 
that the express company engaged in similar work for other 
railroads than the Union Pacific Railroad Company. 
At page 15 of plaintiff's brief he asserts. that Moleton de-
termined the presence of gas in bunkers of refrigerator cars 
by the fact that he became dizzy when he got into fresh air. 
It is significant to note that he did not become dizzy on the 
occasion of the accident (R. 113). It appears that when the 
plaintiff climbed out of car FDEX9084 from which he fell, 
he felt "good", that he was not dizzy after working in the 
first two cars which he reached in the train, and that he felt 
the same upon reaching the fresh air after working the third 
car; FDEX9084; and that he thought all gas had left the 
bunkers of these cars because of the fact that he had 
left the plugs open (R. 126, 112, 113, 114, 13·9'). It further 
appears that the next thing the plaintiff can remember after 
closing the plug on the third car is that he was lying on th~ 
ground in an injured condition. There is no factual evidence 
to the effect that plaintiff suffered carbon monoxide pois-
oning. 
? Plaintiff further asserts at page 16· of his brief that he 
lost consciousness "when he got into the fresh air." No such 
testimony appears in the record. The fact that Moleton does 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
fu 
not remember falling is no evidence that the plaintiff was .1?1 
unconscious during the fall. Certainly one may search the :oour! 
record in vain for testimony to the effect that Moleton be-
came unconscious before the fall. 
rei 
It will be necessary for the defendants to add to plain- rul 
wit tiff's statement of facts during the course of the argument 
rer 
contained in this brief. Such additions are not inconsistent !no 
with the statement of facts given in plaintiff's brief, ex- me 
cept as noted above. In such instances references to the rec- w 1 
ord will be given. wbB 
co 
Only the first cause of action of plaintiff's complaint !~ij 
is of any interest on this appeal. The plaintiff asserts at mff 
IDa'· pages 5 and 6 of his brief that he relies only upon his first than 
cause of action. Apparently this was his real intention since Ern 
his argument is addressed exclusively to the theory that oou 
plaintiff made a jury question of liability under the Fed- effel 
~llirl 
eral Employers' Liability Act, which said act has no appli-
cation to either the second or third causes of action contained 
ilieil in plaintiff's complaint. We assume, therefore, that assign- ~uch 
ments of error Nos. 3, 4 and 5, contained at page 20 of plain- our, 
tiff's brief are abandoned by plaintiff. vie11 
fue 
In the case of Palfrey1'1W1Yt v. Bates & Rogers Const. Co., men 
108 Utah 142, 158 P. (2) 132, this court said: 
"We are favored with no citation of authority in ,fufue 
the appellant's brief. This court does not look with 'ruleH 
favor upon the cause of a litigant who raises points ioourt 
and casts them in the lap of the court for research and 
determination, and if this is done, it is within the 
discretion of the court to refuse to consider them." or 
the 
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~ In the case of Aiken v. Le:s Taylor Motor Crnnpany, 110 
Utah 265, 171 P. (2) 676, Mr. Justice Wolfe, speaking for 
the court, said : 
"The assignment of error should not be a mere 
repetitious itemization of practically all the acts and 
rulings of the trial court which are set out by counsel 
with the hope that one or more will be found to be 
reversible error. Rather the assignment of error 
should clearly and concisely inform the court and 
the adverse party of the errors relied on for reversal 
so that the court and the adverse party may know 
what questions are to b~ raised in the appeal. Some 
counsel make mass assignments of error (more than 
180 in some cases) when only ten or fifteen would be 
sufficient to raise all the real issues involved. Such 
mass assignments are not helpful as they bury rather 
than indicate and define the issues of the appeal. 
Errors must be assigned but care and effort should 
be taken to make those assignments so that they will 
effectively serve the purpose for which they are re-
quired. 
"We have searched appellants' brief in vain for 
their assignment of errors set out and labelled as 
such. Only a most liberal application of the rule and 
our desire to give the appellants the benefit of are-
view prevents this appeal from being dismissed for 
the reason that their brief does not contain a state-
ment of the errors upon which they rely for reversal." 
In the case of United States Building & Loam Ass'n. v. 
Midvale H01ru~ Firmnce Corp., 86 Utah 506, 44 P. (2) 1090, 
this court said : 
"It is not pointed out in the unit holders' brief 
or elsewhere wherein the evidence does not support 
the questioned findings, nor wherein the evidence 
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touching such findings may be found in the trans-
cript. Under such circumstances the appeal of the 
unit holders must be regarded as being prosecuted 
solely upon the judgment roll." 
We believe that this court should hold that assignments 
of error Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are waived by the failure of the 
plaintiff to submit any argument in support thereof; but 
in any event we shall confine our answer to plaintiff's brief 
to those issues which it properly presents, i. e. assignments 
of error No. 1 and No.2. To go further and defend the rul-
ing of the trial court attacked by assignments of error Nos. 
3, 4 and 5 is impractical since neither the defendants nor 
this court have any information as to the basis upon which 
the plaintiff rests said assignments. 
In support of his first two assignments of error the 
plaintiff has divided his argument into four points, as set 
forth on page 21 of his brief. We accept those four points as 
the legal issues presented on this appeal; and our brief will 
be addressed to the four propositions urged by plaintiff in 
the same order as these arguments appear in plaintiff's brief. 
AR,GUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
By Point No. I of his argument plaintiff contends that 
the plaintiff was an employe of the defendant railroad com-
pany, in the following language: "The plaintiff, within 
the meaning of the F. E. L. A., was employed by the defen-
dant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, which admittedly 
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was engaged as a common carrier by railroad in interstate 
commerce." As stated by the plaintiff, we admit that the 
defendant railroad company was engaged in interstate com-
merce as a common carrier by railroad. We deny that plain-
tiff was employed by the railroad company within the mean-
ing of the F. E. L. A. Title 45, Section 51, United States 
Code Annotated, provides, in so far as is material, as fol-
lows: 
"Every common carrier by railroad while en-
gaging in commerce between any of the several states 
* * * shall be liable in damages to any person 
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier 
in such commerce * * * for such injury * * * 
resulting in whole or in part from ~he negligence of 
any of the officers, agents or employees of such car-
rier * * * 
"Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose 
duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of 
interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way 
directly or closely and substantially, affect such com-
merce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of 
this chapter, be considered as being employed by such 
carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as 
entitled to the benefits of this chapter." 
The words chosen by Congress to define the industrial rela-
tionship which invokes the application of the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act are, "while he is employed by such 
carrier", and the further words, "any employee of a carrier." 
Since the enactment of this s.tatute the courts have uniformly 
refused to give any artificial meaning to the language above 
referred to and have insisted that the'words "employee" and 
"employed" are used in their common and usual sense. 
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Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 237 U. S. 
84, 3.5 Sup. Ct. 491, 5:9 L. Ed. 849. In this case suit w~ 
brought by a pullman porter against the Railroad Company 
operating the train in which the pullman car where the 
plaintiff worked was being transported. The Supreme Court 
of the United States stated this principle in the following 
language: 
"We are of the opinion that Congress used the 
words 'employee' and 'employed' in the statute in 
their natural sense and intended to describe the con-
ventional relation of employer and employee." 
See also 
Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 252 U. 
S. 475, 40 Sup. Ct. 358, 64 L. Ed. 670; 
Stevenson v. Lake Terminal Railroad Co., 42 
Fed. (2) 35·7; 
Reynolds v. Addison Miller Compmny, et al., 255 
P. 110. , 
Plaintiff is therefore foreclosed from any support for his 
argument upon the theory that the words "employee" or 
"employed" have any special significance as used in the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act. His relationship to the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company must be determined on fa-
miliar principles. This factor alone should be conclusive 
as to the question of the relationship between the plaintiff 
and the Union Pacific Railroad Company in view of the evi-
dence. 
The facts as shown by the evidence and as admitted by 
plaintiff's brief may be summarized as follows: 
( 1) Moleton was originally hired by the Pacific 
Fruit Express Company; (R. 72) 
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(2) He worked for that same company approxi-
mately twenty years; (R. 72) 
(3) His wages were exclusively paid by that 
company; (R. 142) 
( 4) He worked under the direct supervision of 
employes of that company with no supervi-
sion by any employe of the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company; (R. 141, 142, 144, 226, 
227) 
(5) His rate of pay was determined by that com-
pany; (R. 142) 
(6) His methods of performing the work were 
governed by rules of that company, as for 
example, the safety rules mentioned in the 
evidence ; (Ex. 4) 
(7) He acquired seniority rights on his job with 
Pacific Fruit Express Company; (R. 124) 
(8) Pacific Fruit Express Company is an inde-
pendent business engaged in performing ser-
vices for various railroad carriers, which 
has been in existence since the year 1906 ; 
(R. 254, 255, 256) 
f 
(9) The only instructions which are given Pa-
cific Fruit Express Company by the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company in the perform-
ance of the Heater Protective Service (the 
type of work in which Moleton was en-
gaged when injured) are switch lists where-
by the orders of the shipper relating to the 
character of the service desired are trans-
mitted. (R. 22'6, 227.) 
Under these circumstances, to contend that Moleton was 
an employe of the Union Pacific Railroad Company is so 
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obviously a strained interpretation of the words "employee" 
and "employed" as to plainly conflict with the principle laid 
down in the Robinson case, supra. 
In the recent case of Gaulden v. Southern Pa.cific Co. 
the identical proposition now urged by plaintiff was pre-
sented to the federal courts. In that case Gaulden was em-
ployed by the same Pacific F'ruit Express Company with the 
same kind of job as Moleton. He was injured at Bakersfield, 
California while engaged as an iceman unloading ice from 
a refrigerator car belonging to the Express Company. The 
ice was stored later to be used in interstate trains. Suit was 
brought against the Express Company and against the 
Southern Pacific Railroad on the theories now espoused by 
the plaintiff herein. The District Court resolved this ques-
tion against the plaintiff in a written opinion, 78 Fed. 
Supp. 651. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals of 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed this result in the following lan-
guage: 
"The judgment is affirmed on the grounds and 
for the reasons stated in the opinion of the trial 
court, 78 Fed. Supp. 651." 
The Circuit Court opinion is to be found in 17 4 Fed. (2) 
1022. Counsel for the plaintiff in their brief state that the 
Circuit Court decision is without opinion (Plaintiff's Brief 
p. 47). The fact appears to be that the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals adopted the opinion of the federal trial court so 
that the trial court opinion is now the opinion of the Circuit 
Court of Appeals. This case stands squarely for the propo-
sition that an employe of the express company, such as Mole-
ton, is not an employe of a railroad carrier. This holding is 
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unmistakable in view of the following language used by the 
trial court and adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals : 
"The terms of the Protective Service contract as 
well as the manner of its performance indubitably 
constitute the pArties independent contractors. The 
Pacific Fruit Express Company performed with its 
own employees at its own expense. No right of con-
trol over the manner and means of performance was 
reserved to the railroads. To be sure certain condi-
tions of performance and means of cooperation and 
assistance are specified in the contract but these pro-
visions,. directed to the successful accomplishment of 
the contract's broad objective, do not invest the rail-
roads with control of the method of performance. 
Cases such as Pennsylvania Railroad Co'. v. Roth, 163 
Fed. (2.) 161, in which the railroad company employed 
a contractor to operate one of its railroad yards are 
not apropos for there is absent here that substantial 
degree of control over the manner and means of per-
formance as was present in Pennsylvania Railroad 
Co. v. Roth and like cases. 
"The remedial and humanitarian purposes of 
the Employers Liability Act in no way impel an in-
terpretation of the contract in favor of an employ-
ment or agency relationship." 
The essential proposition now urged by plaintiff to the 
effect that the express company is nothing more than an 
agent of the railroad company at Laramie, Wyoming, so 
that its employes are in fact employes of the railroad com-
pany, was thus clearly rejected by the most recent opinion 
dealing with the matter in the federal courts. 
It is true that the court in the Gaulden case had another 
basis upon which it could have decided that action in that 
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at the time of the accident it was impossible to determine 
the final destination of the ice being unloaded. In view of 
the fact that carriers other than the Southern Pacific op-
erated in the Bakersfield yards it became impossible to state 
that Gaulden was injured while employed in the service of 
any particular master's master. This is the distinction which 
the plaintiff attempts to rely upon in the case at bar; but 
the federal courts took occasion in the Gaulden case to con-
sider the contention now urged by plaintiff as well and the 
decision is so plainly a determination of the issue now raised 
on this appeal that the effect of that opinion should be con-
trolling in this case. 
The case of Reynolds v. Addison Miller Co., 143 Wash. 
271, 255 P. 110, is another ruling squarely in point and 
squarely overruling the contentions now urged by the plain-
tiff. In that case the Addison Miller Company and a rail-
road company had made a contract whereby the railroad 
leased to the Miller Company an icehouse and icing equip-
ment. The Miller Company agreed to manufacture, sell and 
deliver in the bunkers of refrigerator cars which the rail-
road might set out at the icing platform, all ice that was 
required for use by the railroad. The railroad company had 
the right to inspect the work performed by the Miller Com-
pany. The plaintiff was injured while engaged in icing a 
car for the railroad company. Reynolds sued the Miller Com-
pany and the Railroad Company for his injuries, basing his 
complaint on the theory that his cause of action was governed 
by the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It is to be noted 
that in this case there could be no contention that the opinion 
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is based upon any uncertainty as to which carrier would 
receive the benefit of the services of the employe of the icing 
company. In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court of 
Washington said : 
"The question then first for consideration under 
this act is whether at the time of the respondent's 
injury he was an employee of a common carrier by 
railroad. To answer this question it is necessary to 
determine the effect of the contract between the Ad-
dison Miller Company and the Northern Pacific Rail-
way Company. Under the authorities that contract 
was valid and constituted the Addison Miller Com-
pany an independent contractor, and its employees 
would not be employees of the Railway Company en-
gaged in interstate commerce." 
The court went on to cite the opinions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, commencing with the Robinson case, 
supra, and determined that the plaintiff was not an employe 
of the railroad company. It then took occasion to refer to a 
previous opinion which it had written holding that a railway 
company which had employed a construction company to do 
particular work made all the employes of the construction 
company employes of the railway company within the mean-
ing of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Washing-
ton Supreme Court specifically held that this opinion had 
been written without proper consideration and that there 
was no proper legal basis for any such holding. 
The two cases cited above dealing with the Pacific Fruit 
Express Company and another company whose business was 
substantially identical thereto stem from opinions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States construing similar sit-
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uations in other industries closely connected with railroad 
operations. The first such decision by the Supreme Court 
of the United States was handed down in the case of Robin-
son v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, supra. In that 
case the plaintiff was a pullman porter on a car which was 
being hauled by the defendant railroad company. He sued 
for injuries sustained as a result of a collision which, it was 
alleged, was occasioned by the negligence of the Railroad 
Company. The defendant introduced in evidence a contract 
between the plaintiff and the Pullman Company by which 
the plaintiff released all railroad corporations over whose 
line the cars of the Pullman Company might be operated 
from all claims whatsoever arising out of personal injury 
or death. The plaintiff contended that this contract was in-
valid and therefore inadmissible as in violation of the sec-
tion of the Federal Employers' Liability Act which prohib-
ited contracts or devices to exempt carriers from liability 
created by the Act. It therefore became necessary for the 
Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether 
or not a pullman porter, nominally employed by the Pull-
man Company, was within the coverage of the Act. After 
reviewing the facts of the relationship between the railroad 
company and the Pullman Company, Mr. Justice Hughes, 
speaking for the court, indicated that the words "employee" 
and "employed" contained in the statute were used in their 
natural sense, as heretofore stated. He further pointed out 
that it was well known that there were on interstate trains 
many persons engaged in various services for masters other 
than the railroad company operating the train. He stated 
that Congress, though familiar with this situation, did not 
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use any expression which could appropriately be taken to 
indicate a purpose to include such persons within the cover-
age of the Act. The Supreme Court unanimously concluded 
that the plaintiff was not an employe of the Railroad Com-
pany within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. 
Counsel for the plaintiff have asserted that the decision 
of the District Court in the case at bar makes it possible for 
railroad companies to discharge all the various jobs neces-
sary to the operation of trains through other corporations, 
thus eliminating all employes from the coverage of the 
federal statute. The fact is that certain work occasioned by 
the operation of railroad trains has historically been per-
formed by the railroad companies and other jobs incidental 
to the operation of these trains have been performed by 
other industries and companies. The Pullman Company is 
one example of an industry affiliated with the operation of 
railroad trains which historically has been handled by a 
separate company whose employes are held to be outside the 
coverage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We are 
all familiar with the functions which pullman porters per-
form in the operation of a passenger train. Plaintiff sug-
gests that Moleton was performing work which was the · 
work of the railroad company so that he was, in fact, the 
employe of the railroad company. Can it fairly be said that 
the work performed by a pullman porter is less the work of 
the railroad company hauling the train on which he is in 
service than was the work performed by Moleton for the 
Pacific Fruit Express Company in the Laramie yards? It 
is equally true as to each of these fact situations that the 
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work performed by a pullman porter or the work performed 
by Moleton is essential to the operation of interstate trains. 
But the fact remains that in each instance this work is per-
formed by a separate business organization distinct from 
the railroad company and that the work is, in fact, done for 
such separate business organization. The reason for this 
historical separation of strict railroading from supplemental 
services, however necessary the work in connection with such 
supplemental services may be, is unimportant. The distinc-
tion exists, has been recognized by the Supreme Court of 
the United States, and, as will be pointed out, has been ap-
proved by Congress. 
Following the Robinson case the Supreme Court of the 
United States was called upon to consider the matter more 
fully in the case of Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Bond, Administrator of Turner, 240 U. S. 449, 36 Sup. Ct. 
403, 6·0 L. Ed. 735. In that case the deceased, William L. 
Turner, was killed while unloading coal to be used by the 
defendant railroad company at Enid, Oklahoma. His admin-
istrator brought suit against the railroad company alleging 
that his death was caused by the negligence of the railroad 
company and attempting to invoke the benefits of the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act. It appeared that T'urner had 
performed work for the railroad company under a contract 
requiring him to place all coal required by the company in 
coal chutes so that the same could be discharged into the 
engines of the railroad. He had other work consisting of 
breaking the coal, unloading wood from cars to storage piles, 
loading cinders from the right of way of the railroad com-
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and unloading sand from cars furnished by the railroad 
company at points designated by it. The contract required 
considerable direction and instruction to Turner by agents 
of the railroad company. The court in that case held Turner 
to be an independent contractor as distinguished from an 
employe of the railroad company, thus eliminating the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act from the case. Mr. Justice 
McKenna, speaking for the court, used the following lan-
guage in making such determination: 
"There was, it is true, and necessarily, a certain 
direction to be given by the company, or rather, we 
should say, information given to Turner. But the 
manner of the work was under his control, to be done 
by him and those employed by him. He was respon-
sible for its faithful performance and incurred the 
penalty of the instant termination of the contract for 
nonperformance. This was only a prudent precau-
tion, indeed, necessary in view of the purpose 'of his 
contract, which was to make provision for a daily SUP-
ply of coal for the operation of the railroad. The 
power given was one of control in a sense, but it was 
not a detailed control of the actions of Turner or 
those of his- employees. It was a judgment only over 
results and a necessary sanction of the obligations 
which he had incurred. It was not tantamount to the 
control of an employee and a remedy against his in-
con1petency or neglect. 
* * * * * 
"The railroad company, the.refore, did not re-
tain the right to direct the manner in which the busi-
ness should be done, as well as the results to be ac-
complished, or, in other words did not retain control 
not only of what should be done but how it should be 
done." 
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In the case of Hull, AdministrCLtrix of Hull, v. Phila-
delphia & Reading Ry. Co., 25·2 U. S. 475, 40 Sup. Ct. 358, 
64 L. Ed. 670, the Supreme Court of the United States con-
sidered this problem again. In that case the deceased, Hull, 
had for many years been in the general employ of the Wes-
tern Maryland Railway Company. This Railway Company 
operated a railroad from Hagerstown, Maryland to Lurgon, 
Pennsylvania, at which point it connected with the railroad 
owned by the Pennsylvania & Reading Ry. Co., the defen-
dant. Through freight trains were operated from Hagers-
town through Lurgon to Rutherford, Pennsylvania. Hull was 
employed as a brakeman on such a train at the time he re-
ceived his fatal injuries. His administratrix brought suit 
against the Pennsylvania & Reading Ry. Co. claiming lia-
bility under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The 
through freight service along this line was conducted under 
a written agreement between the two railway companies 
which provided that each company was to supply motive 
power in certain proportions, each company was to com-
pensate the other for the use of the other's engines and 
crews, but the division of earnings of the traffic was not 
to be disturbed by the arrangement. Each company had the 
right to enforce its objection to any unsatisfactory employe 
of the other company running upon its tracks and the em-
ployes of each company, while upon the tracks of the other, 
were subject to the rules, regulations, orders and discipline 
of the owning company. The Supreme Court held that under 
such circumstances Hull had not been transferred from the 
employ of the Western Maryland Railway Company to that 
of the defendant at the time when he was killed. The court 
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reiterated the ruling in the Robinson case, supra, that the 
words "employee" and "employed" were used in their nat-
ural sense and went on to state that since each company re-
tained control of its own train crews, what was done on the 
line of the other railroad company was done as part of the 
L employees' duty to their general employer. This was true 
even though the accident resulting in Hull's death occurred 
while the train on which he was working was picking up 
seven cars at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on specific orders 
and instructions of the yardmaster of the defendant com-
~ 
pany. 
In the case of Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 
175,41 Sup. Ct. 93, 65 L. Ed. 205, the Supreme Court of the 
United States reiterated its decisions respecting this matter 
in a slightly different aspect. In that case Taylor, the plain-
tiff, sued Wells Fargo & Company for personal injuries 
received through the derailment of an express car in which 
he was working as the car was being hauled over the rail-
road of the St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Company in in-
terstate commerce. It appeared that Wells Fargo & Com-
pany was a common carrier by express and that it had a 
contract with the railroad company giving the express com-
pany the exclusive privilege of conducting an express busi-
ness on and over the railroad company's line. In this case 
several other problems were treated by the court, but Mr. 
Justice Van Devanter, speaking for the court, took occasion 
to say: 
"As respects the express company, it appears 
not merely that Taylor was in its employ, but also that 
the injuries were received while it was engaged and 
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he was employed in interstate commerce; and so the 
question is presented whether the act embraces a 
common carrier by express which neither owns nor 
operates a railroad, but uses and pays for railroad 
transportation in the manner before shown. The Dis-
trict Court answered the question in the negative and 
the Circuit Court of Appeals in the affirmative. 
"In our opinion the words 'common carrier by 
railroad,' as used in the act, mean one who operates 
a railroad as a means·· of carrying for the public,-
that is to say, a railroad company acting as a com-
mon carrier. This view not only is in accord with 
the ordinary acceptation of the words, but is enforced 
by the mention of cars, engines, track, roadbed and 
other property pertaining to a going railroad * * *." 
This case represents another example of the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that em-
ployment by a company closely allied with the railroad in-
dustry does not make such employe an employe of a common 
carrier by rail so as to invoke the coverage of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. 
The next determination by the Supreme Court of the 
United States on this matter was in the case of Linstead, 
Executrix, v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 276, U.S. 28, 
48 Sup. Ct. 248, 72 L. Ed. 467. This is the case so heavily 
relied upon by the plaintiffin the case at bar. 'In that case 
the deceased, Linstead, was a conductor in the employ of the 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Com-
pany, known as the Big Four. He was working upon a 
freight train running upon the defendant Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Company's tracks in interstate commerce. The facts 
were that the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company had a 
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track from the east to Cincinnati, Ohio, where it delivered 
cars to the Big Four Company for delivery to the northwest. 
It was convenient for both railroads to make an arrangement 
by which the Big Four Company loaned to the Chesapeake & 
Ohio Railway Company equipment and· a train crew to take 
freight trains from Stevens, Kentucky to the Big Four Com-
pany at Riverside, Ohio, over the rails of the Chesapeake & 
Ohio. The defendant Chesapeake & Ohio did not pay the 
Big Four Company any rental for the loan of the locomotive, 
caboose or crew, but paid for this service by rendering a 
reciprocal service of similar nature. Suit was brought by 
the executrix of Linstead to recover damages for his death 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act against the 
~ Chesapeake & Ohio. In this case the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that the deceased was in the special em-
ployment of the defendant, though nominally employed by 
\ 
the Big Four, and sustained recovery under the federal 
act. It is to be noted that the court relied upon the case of 
StUJtUlmrd Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29· Sup. Ct. 
252, 53 L. Ed. 480, which had been cited by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the opinions heretofore dis-
cussed and that the Hull case was distinguished. We have 
no quarrel with the ruling in the Linstead case but certainly 
this case is not in point in the case at bar for the following 
reasons: 
1. The work in which Linstead was engaged at 
the tim:e of his death was not work which 
historically has been performed by compan-
ies other than railroad companies, but was 
the actual operation of a train in interstate 
commerce. 
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2. The work which was being done by Linstead 
at the time of his death was work being done 
under the rules of the Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Company and it was done under the 
immediate supervision and direction of a 
trainmaster of the Chesapeake & Ohio Rail-
way Company. 
The court took occasion to make the following comments 
in passing upon this matter: 
"'The master's responsibility cannot be extended 
beyond the limits of the master's work. If the ser-
vant is doing his own work or that of some other, 
the master is not answerable for his negligence in the 
performance of it. 
"'It sometimes happens that one wishes a cer-
tain work to be done for his benefit and neither has 
persons in his employ who can do it nor is willing to 
take such persons into his general service. He may 
then enter into an agreement with another. If that 
other furnishes him with men to do the work and 
places them under his exclusive control in the per-
formance of it, those men became pro hac vice the 
servants of him to whom they are furnished. But, on 
the other hand, one may prefer to enter into an 
agreement with another that that other, for a con-
sideration, shall himself perform the work through 
servants of his own selection, retaining the direction 
and control of them. In the first case, he to whom 
the workmen are furnished is responsible for their 
negligence in the conduct of the work, because the 
work is his work and they are for the time his work-
men. In the second case, he who agrees to furnish the 
completed work through servants over whom here-
tains control is responsible for their negligence in 
the conduct of it, because, though it is done for the 
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ultimate benefit of the other, it is still in its doing his 
own work. To determine whether a given case falls 
within the one class or the other we must inquire 
whose is the work being performed, a question which 
is usually answered by ascertaining who has the 
power to control and direct the servants in the per-
formance of their work. Here we must carefully dis-
tinguish between authoritative direction and control, 
and mere suggestion as to details or the necessary 
cooperation, where the work furnished is part of a 
larger undertaking.'" Quoting from the Anderson 
case. 
We submit that this case is also authority for the defendants' 
position in the case at bar because the most that can be said 
to be shown by the evidence at the trial is that the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company transmitted to the Pacific Fruit 
Express Company directions (originally given by the ship-
per) as to the heater services to be performed. Certainly 
in the case at bar there is an absence of proof that the Union 
Pacific had the power to control and direct Moleton and 
other employes of the Pacific Fruit Express Company in the 
performance of their work. This remains true though the 
ultimate benefit of the work performed by Moleton and his 
fellow employes was conferred upon the railroad company, 
or perhaps, more properly speaking, the shipper of the mer-
chandise in the cars upon which Moleton worked. 
It appears from the evidence that the only connection 
which the Union Pacific Railroad Company had with Moleton 
was as follows: Before a train would arrive at Laramie the 
Union Pacific conductor on that train would compile a switch 
list showing every car in the train. This list would be com-
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piled from waybills in his possession, which waybills showed 
among other things the instructions originally given by the 
shipper as to the heating service to be furnished. The con-
ductor would telegraph this switch list to the railroad com-
pany employes at Laramie. Those employes would make suf-
ficient copies of this switch list that one or more could be 
furnished to Pacific Fruit Express employes, thus passing 
on the information as to the requirements of service for 
particular cars. From then on the Union Pacific had no 
more concern with the manner or method in which the work 
was done and no more control over the same than does any 
member of this court. We respectfully submit that the fact 
that the railroad company desired to have the work per-
formed by the Pacific Fruit Express Company ultimately 
accomplished does not make the work done by the Pacific 
Fruit Express Company the work of the railroad company 
as contended/ for in plaintiff's brief. The L~"nstead case 
specifically sustains our contention in the following lan-
guage: 
"In the second case (relationship of independent 
contractor) he who agrees to furnish the completed 
work through servants over whom he retains control 
is responsible for their negligence in the conduct of 
it, because, though it is done for the ultimate benefit 
of the other, it is still in its doing his own work." 
If the conveying of the information contained in the switch 
list in the case at bar to the Pacific Fruit Express Company 
is enough to make any employe of the Pacific Fruit Express 
Company doing work on cars covered by the switch list an 
employe of the railroad company, then no service rendered 
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by any third person to the railroad company falls without 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In the course of its 
.business the railroad company may choose to purchase rail-
road cars which are to be constructed by "X" company ac-
cording to rigid specifications. The "X" company will be 
directed by the railroad company to manufacture such cars 
according to plans and specifications furnished. Would it 
be a normal and usual interpretation of this relationship 
to state that employes of the "X" company engaged in man-
ufacturing the cars were employes of the railroad company? 
The railroad company may call upon "Y" company to fur-
nish towel service so that mechanics of the railroad company 
may wash their hands at their place of work. By reason 
of t~e fact that the _railroad company may direct the "Y" 
company to place its roller towel in a certain position on the 
railroad company's premises, to replace the towels at desig-
nated intervals, and to furnish satisfactory service in the 
way of repairs to the mechanism for operating the towel 
service, can it reasonably be maintained that the employe of 
the "Y" towel company engaged in this work is, in fact, an 
employe of the railroad company? Yet what the evidence 
shows was the extent of the Union Pacific's contribution 
to the supervision of Moleton in the case at bar is less than 
the contribution to the supervision of the employes men-
tioned in either of the foregoing situations. 
Counsel for the plaintiff state, at page 29· of their brief, 
that the question as to the relationship of employer and em-
ploye "is not the control over the employe but is whose work 
is being done." In the Linstead case, supra, upon which 
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counsel for plaintiff so heavily rely, Mr. Justice Taft, speak-
ing for the court, said : 
"To determine whether a given case falls within 
one class (employment) or the other (independent 
contractor) we must inquire whose is the work being 
performed, a question which is usually answered by 
ascertaining who has the power to control and direct 
the servants in the performance of their work." 
The cases heretofore mentioned conclusively establish 
that under the facts of the case at bar Moleton was an em-
ploye of the Pacific Fruit Express Company and not an em-
ploye of the railroad company. The decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States require such a holding and, in 
addition, the following cases decided by other courts adhere 
to the same proposition : 
Stevenson v. Lake Terminal Railroad Company, 
42· Fed. (2) 3157, 
Docheney v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 
60 Fed. (2) 808, certiorari denied 77 L. Ed. 
573, 
Pollo·ck v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co., 166 
N. W. 641, certiorari denied 6·3 L. Ed. 421, 
Taylor v. New York Central Railroad Company, 
62 N. E. (2) 777, certiorari denied 326. U. S. 
786. This case was decided in 1945. 
Plaintiff relies upon the case of Jones v. George F. Getty 
Oil Company, 92 Fed. (2) 2,55. We call to the court's atten-
tion the fact that this case presented no question involving 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act in any manner whatso-
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ever. The only question involved was as to the applicability 
of the New Mexico Compensation Act. This case is notre-
motely similar to the Moleton case on its facts. It appears 
that the work which Jones was doing at the_ time of his 
injury was repairing wells owned by the defendant and op-
erated by the defendant, the main portion of the work being 
done by the defendant with the plaintiff assisting therein 
under the general supervision of the defendant. 
Plaintiff also relies upon the Cimorelli, Roth and Bar-
lion cases, all decided by the same court and all cited at page 
37 of his brief. In the Cimorelli case it appeared that the 
defendant railroad company had hired a contractor to op-
erate certain yards at Dock Junction, Pennsylvania. The 
plaintiff was an employe of the contractor and sued the rail-
road under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In that 
case the court determined that the action fell within the 
federal statute, relying upon the following factors: 
1. The defendant selected the place in the yards 
and the time when the work was to be per-
formed. 
2. The defendant determined the amount of 
equipment and the number of employes to 
be furnished by the contractor. 
3. The defendant under its arrangement with 
the contractor had the right to approve in ad-
vance every item of cost and the necessity 
for the purchase of every item of equipment, 
and also the amount of the salary or wages 
of every employe of the contractor, and in ad-
dition, the contractor was to be paid on a 
cost-plus basis. 
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The distinction between that case and the case at bar is so 
obvious as to require no further elaboration. 
In the Roth case the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
followed its previous opinion in the Cimorelli case upon 
substantially the same facts, pointing out that each case 
must be decided on its own facts and circumstances and that 
ordinarily no one feature of the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the defendant is determinative of the em-
ployment question. It appeared in that case that the con-
tract between the railroad company and the contractor who 
nominally, at least, employed the plaintiff, was general and 
indefinite as to the nature of the work to be done and re-
quired that the contractor perform such other work 
incident to the operations as might be requested by 
the company. It further appeared that the contractor 
made changes in the work pursuant to the orders of em-
ployes of the railroad company, and upon this basis the 
Sixth Circuit Court apparently felt that the railroad com-
pany had retained such control of the work being done as to 
require a holding that the relationship between the railroad 
company and the contractor was that of agency, making the 
contractor's employes also employes of the railroad company. 
This case is not similar to the case at bar on its facts and is 
no authority for the plaintiff's present contention. 
The Barlion case arose when Barlion suffered personal 
injuries in the same yards as those in which Roth had been 
injured. Barlion was injured while working for a company 
doing the same work as the contractor in the Roth case and 
the contract was substantially the same in the two cases. 
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The court again pointed out that each controversy must be 
determined on its own peculiar facts and held that the rail-
road had sufficient right of control to require a holding that 
the contractor was an agent of the railroad company, so that 
its employes became employes of the railroad company. 
Again, the facts are not similar to those in the Moleton case 
and the case is not in point on the question involved in the 
present appeal. 
Before concluding this phase of our brief we would like 
to point out to this court a further factor which seems to 
us conclusive of the plaintiff's contentions on this particular 
point. As was stated by the trial court in the Gaulden case, 
cited supra, during the forty year life of the F'ederal Em-
ployers' Liability Act Congress, while liberalizing its bene-
fits, has not seen fit to extend the scope of the statute be-
yond railroading in its true sense. Although Congress took 
occasion to amend the Federal Employers' Liability Act in 
1939 to broaden the coverage of the Act to those employes 
whose work for railroad carriers substantially affected in-
terstate commerce, it did not see fit to enlarge the scope of 
the statute to cover those industries allied with the railroad 
industry but historically separate therefrom. It must be 
assumed upon familiar principles of statutory construction 
that Congress was aware of the interpretation placed upon 
the original act by the Supreme Court in the Robinson, 
Bond, Hull and Wells Fargo cases, supra, and was satisfied 
with that interpretation. 
State v. Roberts, 56 Utah 136; 190 P. 351; 
Annotation-146 A. L. R. 923. 
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because the application of this provision depended upon the 
plaintiff's employment. In other words, if the plaintiff is 
correct in the proposition that he is an employe of the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company as urged in his Point No. I, he 
has no necessity to rely upon the provisions of Section 55 
of the act. If he is not an employe of a common carrier by 
railroad, such as the Union Pacific, then he is not entitled 
to the protection of Section 55. The courts, moreover, have 
specifically overruled the contention now urged by the plain-
tiff. In the Bond case, supra, the exact argument now urged 
by the plaintiff was presented to the Supreme Court of the 
United States and that court again laid at rest plaintiff's 
contention in the following language : 
"We do not think that the contract can be re-
garded as an evasion of Section 5· of the Employers' 
Liability Act, which provides 'that any contract, rule, 
regulation or device whatsoever, the purpose and in-
tent of which shall be to enable any common carrier 
to exempt itself from any liability created by this 
act, shall to that extent be void * * *' 
"Turner was something more than a mere shov-
eler of coal under a superior's command. He was an 
independent employer of labor, conscious of this own 
power to direct and willing to assume the responsi-
bility of direction and to be judged by its results. 
This is manifes.t from the contract under review and 
from the cooperage contract; it is also manifest from 
his contracts with the other companies to whose in-
dustries the railroad company's tracks extended. We 
certainly cannot say that he was incompetent to as-
sume such relation and incur its consequences." 
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In the Gaulden case, supra, the federal courts overruled 
plaintiff's contention in the following language: 
"Section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act, 45 USC 55, provides as follows : 
'Any contract, rule, regulation, or device what-
soever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to en-
able any common carrier to exempt itself from any 
liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent 
be void.' 
"The creation of the Pacific Fruit Express Com-
pany, although intended to further the transporta-
tion business of its two railroad stockholders, oc-
curred before the Act was passed. There is therefore 
no basis for a charge that creation of Pacific Fruit 
Express Company violated Section 5. Chicago, R. I. 
etc. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449, Robinson v. B. & 0., 2;37 
U. S. 84; Wells Fargo v. Taylor, supra. 
"It is suggested that the so-called indemnity 
clause of the Protective Service Contract amounts to 
a violation of Section 5. But inasmuch as this clause 
is one merely of indemnity, it does not have the effect 
of exempting the railroads from their liability as com-
mon carriers under the Act. Hence in no sense may 
it be considered a violation of Section 5." 
For a well considered State court opinion to the same 
effect see the case of Drago v. Central R. Co., 106 A. 803, 
a New Jersey case. In that case the plaintiff was injured 
while transferring steel tires from a railroad car to a lighter 
at the water front. terminal of the Central Railroad Company 
of New Jersey. He sued under the F'ederal Employers' Lia-
bility Act but was denied recovery. Plaintiff contended that 
he was entitled to the benefits of Section 5 of the Act ( 45 
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U. 8. C. A. 55). The New Jersey Court made the following 
observations : 
"We think that no evasion of the provisi_on that 
'any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, 
the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any 
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability 
created by this act shall to that extent be void,' re-
sults from the making of a contract (as here) by an 
interstate railway carrier with an independent steve-
doring corporation under which the work of handling 
the railroad company's freight from cars to boats and 
from boats to cars at its water front terminal is to 
be performed by such independent contract, even 
though the latter expressly assumes all liability for 
injury to its employes while employed upon the prem-
ises of the railroad company." 
The court then cited the Bond case, supra, and went on to 
conclude as follows : 
"In the present case the Stevedoring Corporation 
occupied precisely the same position with respect to 
the defendant that Turner in the Bond Case occupied 
to the railroad. Since the independent contractor him-
self could not recover because not an employe of the 
railroad, it follows that the plaintiff here cannot re-
cover because not an employe of the railroad. Since, 
under the Bond Case, a contract very similar in terms 
to that in the present case was not a contract in viola-
tion of section 5, it cannot be said that the contract 
under consideration is in violation of that section. 
"As was said in effect in the Bond Case, we can-
not say that the contract was one which the parties 
were incompetent to make. By it the defendant rail-
road did not undertake to relieve itself from responsi-
bility as a common carrier to its patrons or the public, 
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and hence we are not now concerned with such a case. 
The defendant railroad evidently considered, for one 
reason or another, that it would be more satisfactory 
to have its cars unloaded by stevedores employed and 
directed by an independent contractor. In entering 
into the contract for that purpose it intended of 
course to relieve itself of the burden of dealing with 
and being responsible for this class of employes. But 
that, as we have seen, it had the legal right to do." 
In view of the foregoing cases we do not believe plain-
tiff's counsel are justified in their sweeping statement to 
the effect that the arrangement in the case at bar is a con-
tract or device in violation of the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. Before a legitimate business arrangement be-
tween a railroad and any other responsible company, by 
terms of which the second company becomes an indepen-
dent contractor in its dealings with the railroad, is declared 
to be null and void as a violation of Section 5 of the F'ederal 
Employers' Liability Act it seems to us that we should have 
some better authority than the unsupported statements 
of the plaintiff's counsel. 
POINT NO. III 
By Point No. III of the plaintiff's brief he asserts that 
the defendant Pacific Fruit Express Company was a com-
mon carrier by railroad in interstate commerce. The im-
portance of this contention lies in the fact that the defen-
dant Pacific Fruit Express Company has admitted Moleton 
to have been its employe at the time of his injuries; conse-
quently, if the Pacific Fruit Express Company was a com-
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mon carrier by railroad in interstate commerce at that time, 
Moleton's cause of action against the Pacific Fruit Express 
Company would be governed by the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. Again plaintiff states, without any semblance 
of authority for his position, that the conclusion is inescap-
able that the defendant express company was a common 
carrier by railroad in interstate commerce because it was 
engaged in a joint enterprise with the Union Pacific, which 
was admittedly a common carrier by railroad. Despite this 
assertion by plaintiff's counsel, we call to the court's atten-
tion that the Supreme Court of the United States has been 
able to escape this conclusion and, in fact, to rule to the con-
trary on every occasion when the matter has been presented 
to it. In the case of Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, cited supra, 
the Supreme Court had occasion to determine whether or 
not Wells Fargo & Company was a common carrier by rail-
road within the meaning of the act. It appeared in that case 
that Wells Fargo & Company transacted express business on 
and over the railroad company's road under a contract giv-
ing it the exclusive right to conduct such business over the 
railroad and obligating the railroad company to refrain 
from competing. The railroad company agreed to transport 
by suitable cars to be provided by it and attached to its pas-
senger trains all express matter of the express company 
and the express company agreed to make payments deter-
mined by a percentage of its gross earnings and to assume 
certain risks of loss. There was an integration of two busi-
nesses much ·more complete than is presented in the case 
at bar. It further appears that the plaintiff urged that the 
contract between the railroad company and Wells Fargo & 
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Company showed a co-proprietorship or sort of partnership 
between them which made him an employe of both. In over-
ruling his contentions the Supreme Court of the United 
States said : 
"In his declaration in the state court Taylor did 
not claim that he was in the employ of the railroad 
company, and his judgment was not obtained on that 
theory. Here it is shown with certainty that he was 
not in that company's employ. True he urges that 
the contract between the two companies shows a co-
proprietorship or sort of partnership between them 
which made him an employee of both; but the contract 
discloses no basis for the claim or for distinguishing 
his case from that of the Pullman porter recently 
before us.' Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co'., 
237 U. S. 84. Here the businesses of the companies 
concerned were quite as distinct in point of control 
and otherwise as they were there. That here the rail-
road company provided the express car is not mater-
ial, for it is measurably equalized by other differenc-
es. In both cases the railroad company provided the 
motive power and the train operatives. The messen-
ger here, like the porter there, was on the train as an 
employee, not of the railroad company, but of another 
by whom he was employed, directed and paid, and 
at whose will he was to continue in service or be dis-
charged. 
* * * * * 
"As Taylor was not an employee of the railroad 
company and the express company was not within 
the Employers' Liability Act, it follows that the act 
has no bearing on the liability of either company or 
on the validity of the messenger's agreement." 
In the case of Reynolds v. Addis'on Miller Comparny et 
al., cited supra, the Supreme Court of Washington was like-
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wise able to escape the conclusion demanded by the plain-
tiff. It is to be noted that the Addison Miller Company was 
doing work identical with the general work performed by 
the Pacific Fruit Express Company. In passing upon the 
contention now raised by plaintiff, the court said: 
"Under the authorities that contract was valid 
and constituted the Addison Miller Company an in-
dependent contractor, and its employes would not be 
employes of the railway company engaged in inter-
state commerce; nor would the Addison Miller Com-
pany itself be within the terms of the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act." 
In the Robinson case, cited supra, the Supreme Court 
of the United States held, in substance, that the Pullman 
Company was not a common carrier by railroad within the 
meaning of the act. This decision was the basis of the court's 
opinion in the case of Taylor v. New York Central R. R. Co., 
cited supra, where the Court of Appeals of New York said: 
"Nor does plaintiff as an employee of the Pull-
man Company come within the federal act and escape 
the controls of the workmen's compensation law. We 
find no express holding in the cases as to whether or 
not an opera tor of parlor and sleeping cars is liable 
to its porters under the federal act, but the answer 
seems plain enough. In Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 
the Supreme Court, denying the applicability of the 
federal act to workers on the cars of a railway ex-
press company said: 'In our opinion the words com-
mon carrier by railroad as used in the act mean one 
who operates a railroad as a means of carrying for 
the public-that is to say, a railroad company acting 
as a common carrier.' " 
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In the Gaulden case, cited supra, plaintiff's contention 
was again overruled. The trial court said : · 
"Plaintiff contends that the Pacific Fruit Ex-
press Company is a common carrier by railroad and 
hence within the reach of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. The Court holds to the contrary. The 
act itself subjects freight common carriers by rail-
road, while engaging in commerce between any of the 
several states or territories, to liability in damages 
to any person suffering injury while employed by 
such carrier in such commerce. 45 USC 51. There 
does not seem to be any doubt at all that the business 
of renting refrigerator cars to railroads or shippers 
and providing protective service in the transportation 
of perishable commodities is not of itself tha~ of a 
common carrier by railroad. Ellis v. Interstate Com-
merce Commisioner, 23~ U. S. 434; U. S. v. Fruit 
Growers Express Co., 279 U.S. 363; Wells Fargo & 
Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 ; U. S. ex rei. Chicago 
Refrigerator Company v. Interstate Commerce 
Comm., 265 U. S. 292; Reynolds v. Addison Miller 
Co., 143 Wash. 271, 255 Pac. 110. 
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was 
amended in 1939. At that time, despite earlier de-
cisions, some of which have been cited, no effort was 
made to include refrigerator companies within its 
terms. Congressional inactivity in that regard must 
be given its usual implication, i. e. acquiescence in 
the judicial rulings. Federal legislation concerning 
the social security of employees employed in Inter-
state Commerce specially included employees of Re-
frigerator Companies within the meaning of the term 
carrier, thus indicating Congressional awareness of 
the actualities. Thus the terms of the statute, plus 
the judicial interpretations of its meaning and the 
obvious knowledge of the Congress over a long period 
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of time as to such judicial pronouncements, make it 
abundantly clear that Pacific Fruit Express Company 
itself is not a common carrier by rail and not subject 
to the provisions of the Act." 
The evidence in the case at bar does not even suggest 
that the Pacific Fruit Express Company was (1) a common 
carrier, or (2) that it was such common carrier by railroad. 
There is no evidence that the Pacific Fruit Express Com-
pany accepts shipments from anyone and as a matter of fact 
it does not accept shipments. The cases mentioned above 
clearly indicate that there is no legal support of any nature 
whatsoever for the proposition that the Pacific Fruit Ex-
press Company is a common carrier by railroad within the 
meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
POINT NO. IV 
The fourth point argued in plaintiff's brief asserts that 
sufficient evidence was introduced in the case to support 
a finding that the defendants were negligent and that such 
negligence contributed in whole or in part to the injuries 
suffered by the plaintiff. In support thereof plaintiff has 
cited six of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States construing the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. He concedes that these cases are not in point on 
the facts of this particular case. 
In the event that this court determines the F'ederal Em-
ployers' Liability Act to be inapplicable to plaintiff's claim, 
it will be unnecessary to consider Point No. IV at all; and 
we therefore believe that no discussion of Point No. IV of 
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plaintiff's brief should be required. But to complete our 
answer to the four points urged by Moleton we desire to 
make the following observations on Point No. IV of plain-
tiff's brief. 
We concede that the plaintiff introduced sufficient evi-
dence to n1ake a jury question of negligence against the 
Pacific Fruit Express Company if Moleton's fall was due 
to carbon monoxide poisoning. The issue which we raised 
by our motion for nonsuit and by our argument thereon was 
based upon the insufficiency of the evidence presented to 
show that the plaintiff's fall and the consequent injuries 
suffered therefrom were contributed to or caused by such 
carbon monoxide poisoning. Unless the evidence is sufficient 
to make a jury question upon the fact of Moleton's fall hav-
ing in some manner been contributed to by carbon monoxide 
poisoning, there could be no causal relationship between the 
negligence alleged and the injuries complained of since all. 
of the plaintiff's theories of liability revolve around the 
basic premise that carbon monoxide poisoning rendered 
Moleton unconscious and thus produced the fall. 
No question is here presented involving any peculiar 
legalistic meaning of the term "proximate cause." The point 
which we now wish to make to this court is that the evidence 
fails to show that carbon monoxide poisoning was in fact a 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. There is no direct testimony 
in the record to the effect that plaintiff suffered such pois-
oning at the time of the accident; and if his case is sufficient 
to go to a jury on this matter it can only be held sufficient 
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on the theory that a jury could properly draw some sort of 
inference that Moleton's fall was so caused. 
We are not unmindful of the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the Lavender and Tenant cases 
cited in plaintiff's brief. These cases do hold in substance 
that jurors must be permitted a certain amount of specula-
tion and conjecture in choosing what seems to them the more 
reasonable as between two or more conflicting inferences; 
but we do not understand that the Supreme Court of the 
United States has ever receded from the proposition which 
found expression in the case of Atchi'3on, Topeka & Santa 
Fe Railway· Co. v. Toops~ 281 U. S. 3S1, 50 Sup. Ct. 281, 74 
L. Ed. 89-6, where Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for that court, 
stated that the type of inference which a jury would be per-
mitted to draw must be a reasonable one. We believe that 
the Lavender and Tenant cases go no further th3;n to state 
that a jury must be permitted to choose between conflicting 
reasonable inferences; and to further state that it is of no 
consequence to a court whether the jury chooses the more 
reasonable or less reasonable as between such inferences. 
But it still remains for every trial court or appellate court 
to decide whether or not as between conflicting inferences 
one is so unlikely as to be unreasonable, so that it could 
not properly be the basis for a jury verdict. In any case 
where the inference sought to be drawn to support liability 
is so unsubstantial as to fail to commend itself to any reason-
able person no jury should be permitted to draw the same. 
So in the case at bar if the inference of carbon monoxide 
poisoning as a contributing factor to the accident is so weak 
and unsubstantial as to be unreasonable, the jury should 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
not have been permitted to draw the inference in support 
of a verdict for the plaintiff. Each case must, of course, be 
viewed on its own facts and the reasonableness of the infer-
ence sought to be sustained must always be considered in the 
light thereof. 
In the instant case no one can rule out with rigid cer-
tainty the possibility that Moleton's fall may have been 
caused by carbon monoxide poisoning, but consideration of 
the evidence leads us to the conclusion that any inference 
to the effect that such poisoning was a cause of the accident 
is so weak, unsubstantial and unreliable that it could not 
properly be accepted by reasonable mert and should not 
therefore be submitted to a jury for determination. The 
following facts, either shown by the evidence or within the 
judicial knowledge of this court, seem to us important and 
to lead to that conclusion : 
( 1) Carbon monoxide is lighter than air ; 
(2) The hatch in the top of the bunker of the 
car from which Moleton fell had been open 
for several minutes before Moleton entered 
the bunker; 
( 3) Moleton himself had been in the open air 
for enough time after working in the bunk-
ers of the first two cars which he reached on 
the day of the accident that any possible 
effects of gas in the bunkers of those cars 
should have been dissipated. This is dem-
onstrated by the fact that FDEX9084, which 
was the second car from the west end of the 
train, was three car lengths removed from 
the nearest other heater cars in which the 
plaintiff worked on the day of the accident; 
(See Exhibit 4~) 
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( 4) Moleton was in the bunkers. of the three cars 
a total of less than six minutes and in the 
bunker of FDEX9084 only a minute or two; 
( 5) There is no evidence that carbon monoxide 
gas ever caused anyone difficulty under cir-
cumstances such as outlined above and made 
apparent by the evidence in this case; 
( 6) The symptom of carbon monoxide poison-
ing observed by the lay witnesses is dizziness 
felt upon reaching fresh air, but Moleton 
experienced no such symptom after leaving 
any of the bunkers on the day of the accident 
and, in fact, displayed no symptom of car-
bon monoxide poisoning whatsoever; 
(7) There are numerous other possible explana-
tions as to the cause of the accident; two 
which readily occur are as follows.: (a) 
Moleton might have fainted from causes 
wholly dependent upon his own physical con-
dition; (b) Moleton might have slipped and 
fallen without losing consciousness at all; 
and his recollections thereof may be lost due 
to the shock he sustained as a result of the 
fall. Such other possible explanations do 
not, of course, eliminate the possibility that 
carbon monoxide poisoning contributed to 
the fall and the consequent injuries; but 
these other possibilities must be taken into 
account in determining whether the infer-
ence of gas poisoning is, in fact, a reasonable 
inference; 
( 8) No medical evidence was offered by the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that he had ever 
displayed any symptoms. of carbon monoxide 
poisoning. In fact, no medical evidence of 
any kind was offered by the plaintiff to sup-
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port his theory as to how the accident hap-
pened or even to prove that the accident 
could have happened as the plaintiff now 
claims by his brief that it did. 
In view of the extent to which the Supreme Court of the 
United States has broadened the field within which a jury 
may be permitted to conjecture and speculate as to matters 
of negligence and causation, it seems to us that it would be 
a useless thing to attempt to refer this court to cases of by-
gone days dealing with situations similar to this case. The 
cases of fifteen years ago are, for the most part, unreliable 
guideposts in deciding matters of negligence and causation 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in view of the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. But never-
theless, we are of the opinion that careful examination of the 
evidence in this case shows the inference that carbon monox-
ide poisoning contributed to plaintiff's fall to be so unlikely, 
unsubstantial and unreasonable as to fall far short of any ac-
ceptable standards of proof recognized by the law. To attrib-
ute Moleton's fall to gas poisoning is not to draw a reason-
able inference. It is just plain guessing and it is an unrea-
sonable guess at that. This seems to us to require a hold-
ing that the plaintiff has failed in his proof even in view 
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
cited by the plaintiff. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that Moleton's claim does not 
fall within the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act for the following reasons : ( 1) He was not an employe 
of the Union Pacific Railroad Company; and (2) he was 
employed by the Pacific Fruit Express Company which is 
not a common carrier for hire and which is not, therefore, 
subject to the act. But even in the event that this court 
should rule that the act was applicable, we do not believe 
that the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence that a jury 
could be permitted to find that his injuries were caused in 
whole or in part by the negligence of the defendants. There-
fore, the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
Counsel for 
Defendarnts and Respondents. 
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